By Helmoed Römer Heitman
The current level of defence funding will allow retaining most key capabilities at a core level, assuming no unfunded missions and a stop to irrational spending. Perversely, underfunding has meant that most equipment has not been used as much as planned – operationally or for training – so allowing useful life extensions, buying time before needing funding for new acquisitions.
But some additional funding will be needed to overhaul, address obsolescence and modernize, if that equipment is to remain useful, and some will be worth upgrading. Finally, some that is no longer suited to its original role could be adapted to new roles.
A good example of that latter is the Ratel. The Ratel cannot realistically be upgraded to continue as an infantry combat vehicle, but that is no reason to throw away the 760 or so still on hand in standard configurations. Some could be modernized to give some motorized battalions a semi-mechanised combat team, some could be used in existing configurations for convoy escort and road patrol, some could be fitted with a counter-drone turret such as that developed by Centauri, and others could be converted to APCs by removing the turret, adding an overhead weapons station and additional seats, delaying the need for new APCs. The turrets removed from some Ratels could later be used to arm a new light armoured car.
Staying with the Army, the Rooikat, G6 and Bateleur can all remain very effective given some modernization. Those intended for near-term use will need to be fitted with the hard-kill variant of the LEDS self-protection system, as should the Ratels, and that might perhaps integrate the 20×42 mm Inkunzi Strike as close-in layer. Electronic self-protection equipment will also need to be added. The Army could also acquire course-corrected ammunition for the G6 and G5 and perhaps re-arming the G6 with L52 guns and acquiring loitering munitions for the Bateleur. An upgrade of the Vulture UAV could also be part of such a package. The Olifant will need more thought but could be reconfigured for urban combat and complemented with a heavy ICV built from older Olifant hulls.
For the Air Force, the priority should be to refurbish and modernize the Oryx and Rooivalk, and updating ECM systems. The Rooivalk needs precision weapons, laser-homing rockets for air-to-ground and counter-drone use, and Mokopa for heavier targets. Replacing the sight with one that has both a laser designator and a beam generator, would allow use of the Ingwe against targets under cover. Both Mokopa and rockets should also be integrated with the Super Lynx.
The Gripen fleet will need a software upgrade and full A-Darter deliveries and is in dire need of precision and stand-off air-to-ground weapons, perhaps Umbani, an anti-radar missile and a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. The latter might be leased Meteors pending relaunched Project Marlin to also meet Navy and Army requirements. The Hawks should be armed for the air-to-ground role, perhaps including Mokopa adapted for fast jet use. Both types could also be given laser-homing rockets for counter-drone capability, and both need their ECM systems updated. We could also revisit the boosted guided bomb (GBB) and its anti-radar version (BARB) as low-cost complements to more complex weapons.
Transport will have to continue with the last C-130s and utility types, with the former needing an ECM system. Looking beyond modernization there is an urgent requirement for at least a coastal maritime surveillance type.
The Navy has been allocated some funds for refits, but those cover only the ship systems, not their combat systems, so funding will be needed to ensure continued useful capability.
The primary role of the frigates over their extended life will be maritime security, deterring or countering piracy and maritime terrorism in the Mozambique Channel and its approaches and, in cooperation with mainly the Nigerian Navy, along the west coast of Africa given the growing imports oil from Nigeria.
Their likely role will require modernization or replacement of the combat management systems and sensors, adding drones and reconfiguring the armament to deal with small craft and protect against weapons ranging from RPGs at close range and anti-tank missiles and drones at greater ranges, all used by irregular forces. That implies additional light weapons and giving precision capability against small targets. Perhaps additional Sea Rogue mountings, 30 mm CamGuns, laser-guided rockets for counter-drone engagement and to counter fast boats, and Mokopa to extend the defence layer. The risk of anti-ship missiles is small but not zero, given the provision of such weapons to some irregular forces, so the Umkhonto missiles will need to be updated. At the opposite end, we might add LEDS to protect the bridge/operations room area against close-in RPG fire when inshore, and anti-tank missiles leaking through the defence layers.
Considering drones, while the CamCopter or similar would be immensely valuable, small and low-cost FPV drones will also have their use – for instance to monitor the far side of a ship to be boarded. Armed small drones would also be a useful weapon against small craft. Serious consideration should also be given to integrating USVs for reconnaissance.
The primary role of the submarines will be strategic surveillance and Special Forces support. That suggests focus on the combat management system and perhaps a new periscope. With an eye to the unlikely but never impossible, modernization of a proportion of the torpedo holding would be useful.
Given the size of the maritime theatre, there is a strong case for a final refit and life-extension of SAS Drakensberg, to allow extended operations by the frigates and in some case by smaller vessels.
Obsolesence management, modernization and even upgrades will not magically restore full defence capability, but will buy time.
