Helmoed Römer Heitman
There is clearly an urgent requirement to rethink defence, specifically what capabilities the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) must have and those it should have, and then to develop plans to sustain, rebuild or create those capabilities. Before seeking to translate required capabilities into a force design we need to establish the principal considerations that must inform the force design process.
The political and strategic situation in the world and Africa is extremely fluid, as are:
· Trends in political utility and the nature of conflict and war.
· The reality of major power competition, which will impinge on Africa.
· The nature of potential opposing forces, ranging from regular armies to criminal gangs with military capabilities.
· Operational and tactical developments in regular and irregular warfare.
· The nature of the weapons and equipment available to regular and irregular forces.
This fluidity makes it impossible to predict with any certainty at all when or where challenges or threats might arise; or what form those challenges or threats might take. In this regard it will be wise to bear in mind how quickly and unexpectedly conflicts and full-scale war can arise. Taking just a few examples of unexpected wars:
· The Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973
· Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1977
· Uganda’s attempted invasion of Tanzania in 1979
· The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
· Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980
· Libya’s incursions into Chad in the 1980s
· Argentina’s seizure of the Falklands in 1982
· The US invasion of Panama in 1989
· Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990
· The invasion of Zaire by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (later also Angola) in 1996
· Angola’s use of troops to force “regime change” in the Congo Republic in 1997
· The invasion of the DRC by Uganda and Rwanda in 1998
· Eritrea’s attack on Ethiopia in 1998
· The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003
· The Russian occupation of parts of Georgia in 2008
· NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011
· Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014
· Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022
The nature of a conflict can also change unexpectedly and quite dramatically, with implications at the strategic and tactical levels.
Examples at the strategic level might include:
· The invasion of South Vietnam by conventional North Vietnamese forces in 1975, which South Vietnam, with forces focused on counterinsurgency, could not withstand.
· The Soviet-funded Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975, which ensured the MPLA’s seizure of power.
· The Soviet-funded Cuban intervention in Ethiopia in 1977, which defeated the Somali invasion and indirectly led to the collapse of Somalia.
· The rebel seizure of two-thirds of Mali in 2012, which required a major intervention by France to reverse.
Examples at the tactical level might include:
· The overrunning of the Nigerian Army UNAMID base at Haskenita in Darfur in 2007.
· The improvement in the military capabilities of rebel forces in Chad and Sudan, which resulted in serious attacks on N’Djamena and Omdurman in 2008.
· The change in Seleka’s military capability in 2013 which led to their seizure of Bangui.
· The overrunning of the Kenyan Army UNMIS base at el-Ade in Somalia in 2016.
· The development in M23’s capabilities plus the increased level of Rwandan support, which led to the fall of Goma to M23 in 2025.
Any force design must, therefore, be understood as work in progress and as a starting point from which force concepts and designs will evolve to meet the demands of an evolving strategic environment. General Dwight Eisenhower’s view that “plans are useless, but planning is indispensable” is apposite here; plans will be overtaken by developments and events, but thorough planning will enable a military to adapt quickly to developments and events because they will have run through a wide range of possibilities and options and have, at least in draft form, a plan B or even a plan C and more.
Considering the capabilities that will be required of the SANDF, and doing so in the context of South Africa’s role in Africa and the realities of the African theatre of operations, it is clear that the defence force will almost always be a small force in a large theatre, which has major implications for unit and formation organisation and for logistic support concepts and systems. Beyond that, the SANDF will very probably find itself having to:
· Deploy and sustain forces over extended strategic distances.
· Conduct operations over great operational and tactical distances.
· Counter very varied threats, some in quick succession, some simultaneously.
· Conduct complex operations in complex geographic and social terrain.
· Conduct operations together with other, often very different, forces.
Agile, evolving, adaptable and resilient defence force
Considering all of that, we can say we will need an agile, evolving, adaptable and resilient SANDF, one that is:
· Intellectually agile, able to understand the evolving strategic situation and derive from it the key implications for South Africa and for the defence force.
· Continuously evolving its concepts, doctrines, organisation and training in order to keep ahead, or at least abreast, of developments.
· Able to adapt promptly and quickly to sudden, unforeseen challenges and threats.
· Resilient, able to recover quickly and without loss of cohesion from missteps and setbacks.
This requirement will have implications for:
· The SANDF’s strategic and operational concepts.
· The organisation and capability mix at formation and unit level.
· The logistic support concepts and systems.
· The doctrine development and training systems of the defence force.
· The education and training of officers and defence civil servants.
· The underlying structure and management systems of the defence force.
· The acquisition and procurement systems of the defence force.
· The fundamental defence funding concept.
Effective intelligence support
That defence force will also require effective intelligence support at the strategic, operational, tactical and technological levels. It will have to be provided with intelligence that is:
· Based on broad and alert general surveillance of the strategic environment.
· Collected early and continuously, to a focused, mission-oriented collection plan.
· Promptly followed up to confirm accuracy and detail.
· Thoroughly analysed and annotated.
· Promptly disseminated as widely as practicable.
· That tracks technological developments and how they applied militarily.
The A3 Defence Force
Given the inevitable funding constraints on defence in times of peace, the force design process must focus on developing an SANDF that meets what we might call the A3 requirement, one that is:
· Appropriate to the strategic situation.
· Adequate to meet the demands of existing and foreseeable challenges and threats.
· Affordable.
Appropriate: The defence force must be appropriate to the defence and security needs of South Africa in respect of its:
· Structure – for instance, in terms of the balance among the combat services and the balance between them and the supporting services and divisions.
· Organisation – for instance, in terms of unit and formation organisations optimised for the dispersed high-mobility operations demanded by the theatre.
· Composition – for instance, in terms of the balance between the regular and reserve components.
· Doctrine – for instance, in terms of effective doctrines for conventional operations, for operations against irregular forces and for expeditionary operations and campaigns.
· Equipment – for instance, in having equipment suited to deterrence and conventional operations, to operations against irregular forces and to expeditionary operations.
· Training – which must prepare all ranks for a wide range of operations and be able to adjust promptly and quickly to new tactical and technological developments.
· Education – which must prepare all ranks, but particularly the officer corps, to keep ahead of the evolving nature of war, the conduct of war and the equipment and systems employed in war.
Adequate: The defence force must be adequate to meet the demands likely to be made on it. An inadequate defence force is a waste of state resources at best, and a source of potentially fatal miscalculation at worst. If it is to serve its fundamental purpose, the SANDF must be adequate in terms of having:
· The strength, standing and mobilisation to discourage military adventures.
· The strength and personnel depth for extended operations against irregular forces.
· The strength and personnel depth to sustain an extended expeditionary campaign.
· The logistic and technical support to enable effective operations.
· The reserves of ammunition, fuel, spares, rations and so on to sustain operations.
· The funding to allow proper training and maintenance.
· Structures and systems focused on ensuring that doctrines, organisation and equipment remain relevant as the strategic environment and the nature of war evolve.
· An appropriate level of defence industrial support.
Affordable: The question of what is affordable in times of peace is always difficult, and the decision rests with the political leadership. That decision must be taken on the basis of sound military advice backed up by an efficiently managed Department of Defence and SANDF that rigorously eliminate:
· Genuine “military luxuries” in the sense of equipment that is really not required but merely “nice to have”.
· Unnecessary duplication of capabilities and facilities.
· Wasteful procedures, particularly including unnecessarily extended and complex acquisition and procurement systems.
Affordability
The decision what is a “luxury”, what is “unnecessary duplication” and when procedures or systems are “inherently wasteful” will always be difficult and fraught with risk, and all such decisions must be carefully considered in the light of practical experience and the experience of other defence forces.
No matter how efficient and cost-effective a defence force may be, there will always be some who will argue it is too expensive and not affordable. One good response to that was the counter-question put by the Chief of the Angolan Navy some years ago: “What will be the cost of not having an effective force?”
It is relevant here to recall that the World Bank in 1993 found that defence spending of around 4% of GDP “is not associated with lower rates of economic growth”.1
Defence spending before the 2025 Budget amounted to 0.5% of GDP and was upped to 0.7% despite President Cyril Ramaphosa committing to 1.5% of GDP.
Pull quote: Given the inevitable funding constraints on defence in times of peace, the force design process must focus on developing an SANDF that meets what we might call the A3 requirement.
Pull quote: The nature of a conflict can also change unexpectedly and quite dramatically, with implications at the strategic and tactical levels.
